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Abstract	
It	is	commonly	argued	that	public	support	for	the	welfare	state	is	in	long-term	decline	in	the	UK.	
Evidence	from	the	British	Social	Attitudes	Survey	(BSA)	is	typically	cited	to	support	this	claim,	but	
it	 only	 stretches	 back	 to	 1983.	 Few	would	 disagree	 that	 the	 Thatcher	 years	 offered	 an	 unusual	
socio-political-economic	 context,	 which	 raises	 a	 question	 over	 whether	 the	 BSA’s	 early	 1980s	
baseline	provides	a	misleading	view	on	support	for	the	welfare	state	over	the	longue	durée.	In	this	
paper	we	explore	this	issue,	piecing	together	data	from	the	Beveridge	era	through	to	the	present	
day,	 drawing	 on	 data	 from:	 contemporary	 studies	 and	 surveys;	 opinion	 polls;	 and,	 historical	
government	surveys	and	reports.	Our	method	is	undoubtedly	a	‘second	best	approach’,	making	use	
of	 often	 limited	 historical	 data,	 which	 means	 we	 remain	 cautious	 in	 offering	 bold	 findings.	
However,	 we	 argue	 there	 is	 some	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 the	 1980s	 were	 an	 unusual	 moment,	
suggesting	the	decline	in	support	for	welfare	is	less	dramatic	than	analysis	of	the	BSA	might	make	
it	 seem,	 but	 also	 that	 support	 for	 the	 welfare	 state	 during	 the	 post-War	 consensus	 years	 the	
Welfare	State	was	 likely	more	equivocal	 than	we	often	believe	 it	 to	be	 from	 today’s	perspective,	
perhaps	reflecting	a	tendency	to	reify	this	period	as	a	‘golden	age’	of	welfare	and	so	underplaying	
the	complexity	of	the	politics	of	social	policy	in	the	pre-BSA	period.	
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Introduction:	Declining	Support	for	Welfare?	
The	House	of	Commons	Work	and	Pensions	Select	Committee	recently	announced	it	would	review	
the	 principles	 of	 social	 security,	 in	 part	 because	 ‘over	 a	 long	 period	 of	 time,	 voters	 have	 been	
withdrawing	support	 for	Britain's	welfare	state	on	 the	basis	 that	 they	believe	 it	 is	no	 longer	 fair’	
(Work	and	Pensions	Select	Committee,	2015).	The	view	that	there	has	been	a	long	term	decline	in	
public	 support	 for	 the	 welfare	 state	 in	 the	 UK	 is	 now	 close	 to	 an	 orthodox	 view.	 Supporting	
evidence	 for	 this	 perspective	 often	 comes	 from	 the	 British	 Social	 Attitudes	 survey	 (BSA),	
undoubtedly	the	most	authoritative	source	of	data	on	attitudes	to	welfare	in	the	UK	over	time1.			For	
instance,	responses	to	the	question	‘should	the	government	spend	more	money	on	welfare	benefits	for	
the	poor,	 even	 if	 it	 leads	 to	higher	 taxes?’	 (figure	 1)	appear	 to	 show	 a	 relatively	 clear	 shift	 from	
strong	majority	 support	 for	 additional	 spending	 in	 the	1980s	 to	 a	much	 less	 supportive	position	
today.	This,	and	related	BSA	data	showing	 fewer	respondents	prioritising	additional	spending	on	
benefits	 for	 the	 unemployed	 (and	 more	 wanting	 cuts	 in	 spending)	 are	 often	 said	 to	 capture	 a	
‘hardening’	of	public	attitudes	since	1983/87	(Clery	et	al.,	2013;	Taylor-Gooby	and	Taylor,	2015).		
[figure	1	here]	
To	provide	 just	 a	 few	key	 examples	 of	 analyses	 of	 the	BSA	data,	Deeming	 (2014:	 6)	 argues	 they	
show	a	 ‘fundamental	 shift	 in	public	 views	on	welfare	provision	over	 the	past	 three	decades’	 and	
that	‘at	the	start	of	the	21st	century,	a	distinct	attitudinal	shift	begins	to	emerge’.	That	relatively	few	
see	benefits	as	inadequate	and	that	some	62%	believe	that	‘out-of-work	benefits	are	too	generous	
and	promote	the	dependency	culture’	are,	he	suggests,	especially	key	(Deeming,	2014:	6).	Taylor-
Gooby	and	Taylor	(2015:	93)	suggest	the	fact	that	people	have	remained	‘relatively	unsympathetic’	
to	 increased	 spending	 following	 the	 recent	 economic	 crisis	 is	 remarkable,	 particularly	 given	 this	
‘relative	 lack	 of	 change	 comes	 after	 years	 of	 a	 steady	 decline	 in	 support	 for	 spending	 on	 public	
services	 in	 general	 and	 on	 welfare	 in	 particular’.	 Similarly,	 Baumberg	 (2014a:	 114)	 notes	 that	
movements	 in	 the	 BSA	 data	 in	 recent	 years	 ‘are	 relatively	 slight	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	more	 far-
reaching	 hardening	 of	 attitudes	 that	 came	 in	 the	 preceding	 10	 to	 15	 years’,	 though	 he	
contextualises	 this	 with	 an	 important	 reminder	 that	 BSA	 data	 show	 considerable	 support	 for	
welfare	 exists	 too	 and	 that	 ‘Benefit	 attitudes	 are	 not	 simply	 “hard”	 or	 “soft”	 but	 complex	 and	
uneven’	(Baumberg,	2014b).			
The	 focus	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 not	 whether	 the	 dominant	 interpretation	 of	 the	 BSA	 is	 an	 accurate	
reading	of	 the	complex	patterns	of	attitudes	captured	by	the	survey	–	the	analyses	we	cite	above	
are	all	 robust	 in	our	view.	 Instead,	we	explore	 the	possibility	 that	 the	 time	 frame	covered	by	 the	
BSA	leads	to	a	misleading	view	of	the	long-term	picture.	The	BSA	did	not	begin	until	the	mid-1980s,	
meaning	 it	cannot	capture	public	attitudes	 to	welfare	during	 the	 ‘golden	age’	of	 the	welfare	state	
that	is	commonly	presumed	to	have	run	from	the	1940s	through	to	mid-1970s	(Wincott,	2013);	we	
review	 attitudes	 data	 covering	 the	 period	 from	 this	 period	 in	 order	 to	 place	 the	 BSA	 data	 in	 a	
broader	 historical	 context.	 In	 so	 doing,	 we	 question	 how	 far	 current	 attitudes	 are	 distinct	 from	
those	 found	 in	 the	 ‘golden	 age’	 of	 the	welfare	 state	 and	 offer	 an	 at	 least	 partial	 challenge	 to	 the	
orthodox	view	that	there	has	been	a	long-term	decline	in	public	support	for	the	welfare	state.	We	
highlight	 instead	 the	often	 contradictory	 and	ambivalent	 attitudes	 to	welfare	held	both	now	and	
during	the	‘golden	age’	and	question	whether	the	BSA’s	early	1980s	baseline	provides	a	misleading	
baseline	period	from	which	to	assess	contemporary	attitudes	to	welfare	against.	
	
Accounting	for	Time:	the	Challenge	of	Context	
A	useful	conceptual	distinction	can	be	drawn	between	public/social	attitudes	(or	public	opinion),	
societal	values	and	culture	based	on	the	degree	of	stability	they	display	over	time	(Hudson,	Jo	and	
Keung,	2014).	According	to	this	framework:	
Public	attitudes	 are	 presumed	 to	 display	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	 temporal	 instability;	 as	 Gelissen	
(2008:	 247)	 notes,	 public	 opinion	 is	 influenced	 by	 ‘the	 immediate	 surrounding	 socio-economic	
conditions’.	 	For	instance,	how	deserving	the	unemployed	are	viewed	to	be	has	been	shown	to	be	
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affected	 by	 the	 unemployment	 rate	 (van	 Oorschot,	 2006).	 During	 the	 period	 we	 examine	 here,	
social	security	spending	has	varied	from	a	low	of	around	5%	of	GDP	during	the	Attlee	governments	
to	a	high	of	more	 than	15%	in	 the	early	1990s	 (Crawford	et	al,	2009);	 responses	 to	questions	of	
whether	 social	 security	 spending	 should	 be	 increased	 or	 not	 will	 in	 part	 reflect	 this	 changing	
context.	To	this	end,	Curtice	(2010)	suggests	attitudes	often	reflect	a	‘thermostatic’	pattern,	support	
for	additional	public	spending	falling	after	a	period	in	which	public	expenditure	has	risen	and	vice-
versa.	
Culture,	by	contrast,	is	a	broad	and	comprehensive	notion,	often	used	to	capture	arguments	that	a	
dominant	 set	 of	 traditional	 beliefs	 (often	 stretching	 back	many	 centuries)	 have	 shaped	 not	 only	
social	policy	but	also	broader	social	structures.	For	example,	Opielka	(2008)	views	religion	as	the	
foundation	 of	 differing	 social	 systems	 and	 Lockhart	 (2001)	 explains	 the	 origins	 of	 institutional	
differences	by	reference	to	a	series	of	cultural	types.		
Societal	values	 sit	 in-between	culture	and	attitudes.	Values	are	described	as	 trans-situational	and	
more	 immutable	 than	 attitudes	 (Hitlin	 &	 Piliavin,	 2004),	 representing	 the	 most	 lasting	 ideas	
regarding	 what	 is	 desirable	 and	 ultimately	 affecting	 attitudes	 (Aalberg,	 2003:	 5-8).	 However,	
societal	 values	 are	more	 discrete	 and	much	 less	 abstract	 than	 culture	 -	 being	 ‘valid	 in	 a	 specific	
societal	context	(Haller,	2002:	143)	–	and	are	expected	to	show	some	change	over	time	for	values	
are	‘dynamically	stable’	(Oyserman	&	Uskul,	2008:	149-150).	Hudson,	Jo	and	Keung	(2014)	suggest	
examples	 of	 societal	 values	 might	 include	 (strength	 of)	 traditional	 family	 values,	 (degree	 of)	
tolerance	and	strength	of	religiosity/importance	of	a	faith.	
Approaching	the	analysis	of	longitudinal	attitudes	data	with	these	distinctions	in	mind	implies	that	
if	context	matters	then	the	time	frame	of	our	analyses	matter	too.	This	is	perhaps	self-evident,	but	
is	an	 issue	we	often	overlook	when	examining	 longitudinal	data	because	the	period	of	analysis	 is	
often	dictated	by	the	first	and	last	available	time	points	in	the	best	available	data	set.	For	studies	of	
attitudes	to	welfare	in	the	UK,	this	means	the	baseline	against	which	trends	are	judged	is	typically	
the	 early/mid-1980s	 when	 the	 BSA	 began.	 Viewed	 through	 the	 ‘thermostat’	 lens,	 however,	 the	
1980s	 is	 a	 problematic	moment	 in	 which	 to	 capture	 attitudes,	 the	 historically	 significant	 social,	
political	 and	 economic	 changes	 of	 the	 decade	 providing	 an	 unusual	 context	 that	 likely	 saw	 the	
‘thermostat’	dial	turned	round	a	good	deal.		
An	additional	reason	to	place	the	BSA	data	in	a	broader	historical	context	is	that	when	high	quality	
time	 series	 data	 offers	 a	 relatively	 clear	 trend	 then	 the	 temptation	 is	 to	 ‘fill	 in	 the	 blanks’	 by	
presuming	 the	 pre-survey	 years	 follow	 the	 same	 pattern,	 especially	 when	 commonly	 held	
theoretical	 presumptions	 about	 the	 past	 imply	 results	would	 follow	 this	 pattern	 if	 only	 the	 data	
existed.	More	specifically,	there	may	be	a	danger	that	a	‘golden	age’	view	of	the	welfare	state	leads	
us	 to	 believe	 the	 downward	 trend	 in	 some	 aspects	 of	 welfare	 support	 since	 the	 1980s	 merely	
represents	the	‘tip	of	the	iceberg’	on	the	basis	support	must	have	been	even	higher	still	during	the	
‘golden	 age’	 (Wincott,	 2013;	 Hudson	 and	 Lunt	 et	 al,	 forthcoming).	 Uncovering	 past	 survey	 data	
helps	us	to	assess	whether	this	was	the	case	or	not.	
In	this	paper	we	piece	together	a	chronology	of	public	attitudes	to	welfare	from	Beveridge	to	the	
start	 of	 the	BSA	 in	order	 to	 ‘fill	 in’	 these	blanks.	We	use	evidence	 from	a	wide	 range	of	 sources:	
opinion	 polls	 (mainly	 derived	 from	 three	 compendia	 of	 polls	 –	 Gallup,	 1976;	Hinton	 et	 al,	 1996;	
Tyler,	 1990	 –	 but	 supplemented	 by	 searches	 for	 relevant	 polls	 not	 covered	 by	 these	 sources,	
particularly	 for	 the	1940s);	private/unpublished	polling/survey	data	(the	Labour	Party,	National,	
and	Nuffield	College	archives);	one-off	surveys	of	attitudes	to	welfare;	and,	longitudinal	surveys	of	
attitudes.	We	stress	caution	needs	to	be	applied	 in	ascertaining	trends	from	these	sources,	which	
are	often	of	 lower	quality	 than	the	BSA.	Nonetheless,	as	Klein	(1974:	408)	observed	 in	an	earlier	
review	of	polling	data,	since	it	 is	 impossible	to	go	back	to	the	1950s,	60s	or	70s	 ‘to	find	out	what	
people	really	thought,	it	seems	worthwhile	making	the	most	of	the	best	surveys	we	have	got	–	while	
remembering	their	limitations’.			
	
	4	
Attitudes	to	Welfare	in	the	1940s	
It	 is	 commonly	 argued	 that	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 ‘transformed	 social	 attitudes	 and	 social	
expectations’	(Fraser,	1984:	210;	Addison,	1975),	but	there	were	few	quantitative	surveys	of	public	
opinion	 in	 the	 1940s	 that	 allow	 this	 claim	 to	 be	 assessed.	 Beveridge	 commissioned	 the	Nuffield	
College	Social	Reconstruction	Survey,	headed	by	G.D.H.	Cole,	 to	undertake	a	 survey	of	 ‘consumer	
attitudes’	 to	 feed	 into	 his	 committee’s	 work,	 but	 the	 Civil	 Service	 insisted	 it	 involve	 no	 direct	
questioning	of	 the	public	(see	Harris,	1977;	Cole,	1971).	 	Consequently,	 it	offered	a	 ‘second	hand’	
view	 of	 public	 attitudes.	 One	 Treasury	memo	 dismissed	 the	work	 as	 ‘a	 collection	 of	 tittle-tattle’,	
while	another	wryly	commented	that	 the	reports	circulated	to	the	Beveridge	Committee	 ‘seem	to	
have	impressed	the	Chairman;	they	impressed	no	one	else’	(PRO/T161/1135).	The	government	did	
not	publish	Cole’s	final	report;	consequently,	opinion	polls	provide	the	only	sources	of	quantitative	
data	for	this	period.			
A	 Gallup/	 British	 Institute	 of	 Public	 Opinion	 (BIPO,	 1942)	 poll	 conducted	 two	 weeks	 after	 the	
publication	of	the	Beveridge	Report	showed	‘nineteen	people	out	of	twenty	had	heard	of	the	report,	
and	nine	out	of	ten	believed	its	proposals	should	be	adopted’	(Calder,	1969:	528).	Jacobs	(1993,	p.	
113)	cites	 this	poll	 to	support	 the	conclusion	 that	 ‘the	Beveridge	Report’s	publication	became,	 in	
effect,	a	lightning	rod,	serving	as	a	focus	and	indisputable	symbol	of	existing	public	attitudes’.	Much	
less	 frequently	 reported	 is	 that	 the	 same	 Gallup/BIPO	 research	 concluded	 that	 public	
understanding	of	 the	detail	 of	Beveridge	proposals	was	 somewhat	 limited.	Moreover,	 it	was	also	
clear	from	this	poll	that	some	areas	were	welcomed	more	strongly	than	others;	health	reforms	had	
the	 clearest	 approval	 (88%	 in	 favour)	 and	 (better)	 pensions	 were	 most	 commonly	 cited	 as	
capturing	the	substance	of	the	Beveridge	Report.	A	bigger	role	for	the	state	was	not	favoured	in	all	
policy	areas	though,	68%	agreeing	‘there	is	no	reason	why	a	childless	widow	should	get	a	pension	
for	 life:	 if	 she	 is	 able	 to	work,	 she	 should	work’.	 However,	 the	 overwhelming	message	 from	 the	
Gallup/BIPO	 report	 was	 that	 people	 were	 supportive	 of	 the	 Beveridge	 Report,	 some	 88%	 of	
respondents	feeling	the	government	should	put	the	plan	into	operation.	
Several	 histories	 of	 social	 policy	 suggest	 that	 an	 initially	 muted	 government	 response	 to	 the	
Beveridge	Report	was	modified	‘in	response	to	public	opinion’	(Jones,	1991:	132).	The	1942	BIPO	
research	 showed	 a	 large	minority	 had	doubts	 over	whether	 the	plan	would	be	 enacted.	Another	
Gallup/BIPO	 poll	 (March	 1943)	 was	 conducted	 following	 debate	 of	 the	 Report	 in	 Parliament,	
respondents	asked	‘On	the	Beveridge	report,	are	you	satisfied	or	dissatisfied	with	the	government’s	
attitudes	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 government	 ministers	 in	 Parliament?:	 29%	 were	 satisfied,	 47%	
dissatisfied	and	24%	no	opinion	(Hinton	et	al,	1996).	 Jacobs	(1993:	114)	cites	this	as	evidence	of	
growing	public	disillusionment	at	the	government’s	failure	to	act	on	the	report,	but	examination	of	
the	original	polling	data	shows	a	 follow	up	question	was	posed	to	those	offering	a	negative	view,	
and	the	range	of	responses	here	offers	a	more	nuanced	picture.	Broadly2,	the	most	common	reasons	
for	 a	negative	 response	were	 indeed	 frustrations	with	 slow	progress/a	 fear	 the	 report	would	be	
shelved	 (around	 30%)	 or,	 more	 strongly,	 that	 the	 troops/working	 class	 were	 being	 betrayed	
(around	20%);	however,	around	30%	expressed	 frustration	at	 the	 lack	of/level	of	debate	 (which	
might	be	read	as	pro-	or	anti-reform),	around	10%	felt	the	war	should	come	first/money	might	not	
be	available,	a	clearly	anti-Beveridge	view	and	another	10%	were	against	the	proposals	for	other	
reasons	(some	due	to	perceived	capture	by	business	others	simply	expressing	disagreement	with	
the	Report).	This	perhaps	suggests	that	public	opinion	was	not	quite	so	fully	behind	the	view	that	
the	wartime	government	was	failing	to	prioritise	responding	to	Beveridge	as	sometimes	suggested.		
Further	Gallup/BIPO	polling	during	1943	(Hinton	et	al,	1996)	lends	some	support	to	the	view	that	
the	Beveridge	project	was	not	quite	as	high	 in	 the	concerns	of	 the	ordinary	voters	as	 sometimes	
presumed.	In	a	September	1943	poll	only	1.95%	cited	 ‘Beveridge;	social	security;	pensions’	when	
asked	 ‘What	do	you	think	 is	 the	most	 important	war	problem	the	Government	must	solve	during	
the	next	few	months?’	and	a	broadly	similar	proportion	mentioned	other	welfare	state	issues	such	
as	health	and	housing;	war	objectives	were	clearly	the	top	concern,	but	strikes,	fuel	shortages	and	
unemployment	all	ranked	higher	than	Beveridge.	 	We	might	naturally	expect	war	objectives	to	be	
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the	 dominating	 concerns	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 but	 polling	 data	 from	 the	
immediate	 post-War	 period	 also	 suggests	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 ambivalence	 towards	 social	 policy	
issues.	 Economic	 questions	 generally	 topped	 the	public’s	 list	 of	 pressing	 concerns	 in	 these	polls,	
social	policy	issues	doing	so	only	very	briefly	when	housing	problems	in	the	immediate	aftermath	
of	the	War	resulted	in	it	being	the	top	concern	in	July	1945	(Gallup,	1976)	and	January	1946	(Klein,	
1974:	409).	It	is	also	striking	that	BIPO	polling	during	the	War	years	included	very	modest	numbers	
of	questions	on	welfare	state	related	issues,	suggesting	–	irrespective	of	public	attitudes	–	that	the	
welfare	state	did	not	seem	to	feature	prominently	in	the	minds	of	the	pollsters3.	
None	of	this	means	there	was	not	strong	support	for	the	welfare	state	reform	agenda	that	followed	
the	War;	 in	 fact,	 by	 February	 1946	 there	was	 71%	approval	 of	 the	 government’s	 plan	 for	 Social	
Security	according	to	a	Gallup	poll.	However,	there	were	some	signs	that	health	and	pensions	were	
the	 areas	most	 strongly	 associated	with	 the	welfare	 state;	 indeed,	 in	 July	 1948	Gallup	 poll	 ‘Free	
doctor’	(46%),	‘Pensions	increase’	(31%)	and	Dentist	(20%)	were	the	top	responses	to	the	question	
‘Can	you	mention	three	of	the	main	benefits	available	to	you	under	the	new	Social	Security	Act	which	
operate	from	July	5th?’4.		
	
Attitudes	to	Welfare	in	the	1950s	
Polling	became	more	 frequent	 in	 the	1950s	and	support	 for	extending	 the	welfare	state	could	be	
found	 in	 many	 of	 the	 decade’s	 polls	 (Gallup,	 1976).	 In	 both	 1951	 and	 1954	 there	 was	 a	 90%	
positive	response	to	the	question:	‘Do	you	think	that	Old	Age	Pensions’	should	be	increased	or	left	
as	 they	 are?’	 An	 April	 1953	Gallup	 poll	 (table	 1)	probed	 views	 on	 spending	 in	 a	 range	 of	 areas,	
finding	particularly	strong	support	for	increases	in	pensions	(even	if	taxes	rise)	and	housing,	but	a	
very	substantial	minority	(43%)	favoured	cuts	 in	 family	allowances	and	around	a	quarter	did	 for	
health	 and	 education.	 That	 said,	 the	 same	 poll	 found	much	 stronger	 support	 for	 cutting	 defence	
spending	(51%),	as	did	a	September	1955	Gallup	poll	where	defence	(32%)	topped	the	list	should	
spending	cuts	be	required,	while	welfare	state	cuts	were	selected	by	few	respondents	(schools	and	
health	both	4%;	housing	2%).	
[table	1	here]	
A	 detailed	 view	 of	 attitudes	 to	 the	 welfare	 state	 is	 found	 in	 a	 survey	 conducted	 in	 1957/8	 by	
Political	and	Economic	Planning	(PEP,	1961).	Their	study	elicited	the	views	of	‘ordinary	families’	on	
the	 basis	 that	 the	 welfare	 state	 was	 targeted	 at	 all,	 not	 merely	 the	 most	 needy.	 Reflecting	 the	
dominant	 view	 of	 the	 time	 that	 ‘ordinary’	 equalled	 nuclear	 family,	 it	 only	 included	 households	
containing	at	 least	one	child	aged	under	16	 (so	 representing	only	 c.	40%	of	all	households).	The	
survey	focused	solely	on	London	in	the	first	instance,	adding	a	subsidiary	sample	of	households	in	
Northampton	once	early	analysis	underlined	that	the	income	levels	of	the	London	households	were	
likely	to	be	higher	than	was	the	case	nationally	(PEP,	1961:	14–19).	In	each	case,	the	target	of	the	
interviews	was	‘mothers’.	The	findings	are	therefore	clearly	not	a	representative	sample	of	the	UK	
population,	but	its	large	sample	of	over	900	households,	and	detailed	questionnaire,	means	it	still	
offers	a	rich	picture	of	citizen	views	on	the	nascent	welfare	state.		
[Figure	2	here]	
Despite	rapid	increases	in	social	spending	over	the	preceding	decade,	only	around	one	third	felt	too	
much	was	being	spent	on	some	services	and	just	over	quarter	believed	that	their	family	contributed	
too	much	to	the	cost	of	social	services;	66%	said	the	government	should	spend	more.	There	seemed	
to	 be	 little	 dissatisfaction	with	 key	 social	 services	 at	 this	 juncture,	 the	 exception	 being	 housing,	
which	 a	 substantial	minority	 (31%)	 said	 had	 been	 of	 insufficient	 help	 to	 them	 (PEP,	 1961:	 20).	
Given	 that	 the	 survey	 excluded	many	 of	 the	most	 vulnerable	 groups,	 this	 underlines	 that	 public	
perceptions	of	the	adequacy	of	housing	in	the	early	post-war	period	were	not	favourable.	Indeed,	
housing	topped	the	list	of	social	services	on	which	respondents	felt	the	government	should	spend	
more	(49%),	echoing	concerns	in	1940s	&	1950s	polls	reported	above.		The	broad	overall	degree	of	
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contentment	with	the	welfare	state	was	also	qualified	in	some	other	ways.	There	were	differences	
in	opinion	 towards	universal	 services/benefits	versus	 those	 that	were	 targeted	and	 contributory	
versus	non-contributory	benefits/services	(Figure	2).	Despite	fewer	households	making	use	of	the	
non-contributory	benefits	–	or,	perhaps,	because	of	this	–	they	were	more	often	picked	out	as	being	
areas	 where	 the	 government	 spent	 too	 much	 money:	 20%	 saying	 this	 was	 so	 for	 Family	
Allowances5	(by	far	the	most	common	choice),	7%	for	National	Assistance	and	just	2%	for	National	
Insurance.	 	 Interestingly,	 the	 report’s	 authors	were	 clear	 in	 their	 view	 that	 connection	with	 the	
concept	 of	 a	 ‘welfare	 state’	 was	 not	 particularly	 deep	 or	 widespread	 and	 that	 for	 many	 of	 the	
respondents	‘the	Welfare	State	was	more	or	less	synonymous	with	health	services’	(PEP,	1961:	35).	
More	strongly	still,	 they	concluded	that	 ‘The	attitude	of	[respondents]	towards	the	social	services	
was	enthusiastic	rather	than	critical,	but	there	is	not	much	doubt	that	this	attitude	is	governed	by	
their	enthusiasm	for	the	health	services’	(PEP,	1961:	39).	
In	1959	Labour	suffered	their	third	successive	General	Election	defeat,	the	Conservative’s	margin	of	
victory	increasing	on	each	occasion.	Abrams	and	Rose	(1960)	conducted	a	detailed	survey	of	public	
attitudes	 for	 Socialist	 Commentary.	 Although	 their	 survey	 was	 actually	 carried	 out	 in	
January/February	1960,	it	acts	as	the	best	available	proxy	for	attitudes	to	welfare	data	at	the	close	
of	the	1950s.	On	the	‘willingness	to	pay	more	taxes	for	social	benefits’,	35%	offered	a	straight	yes	
(15%	a	qualified	yes),	36%	a	straight	no	(4%	a	qualified	no)	and	10%	‘other	answers’.	While	the	
range	of	response	options	complicates	interpretation,	it	seems	fair	to	conclude	that	while	there	was	
a	balance	of	opinion	towards	increases,	a	very	substantial	minority	of	people	were	now	unwilling	to	
pay	more	taxes	for	social	benefits	(Abrams	and	Rose,	1960:	19).	In	terms	of	where	respondents	felt	
public	 spending	 should	be	 focused,	 there	were	 clear	echoes	of	 the	PEP	 survey,	with	Abrams	and	
Rose	(1960:	19)	noting	that	‘Conservative	and	Labour	supporters,	middle-class	and	working-class	
people,	agreed	in	giving	top	priority	to	hospitals’.	More	than	half	of	each	of	these	groups	also	felt	
more	should	be	spent	on	schools	and	housing.		
While	the	survey’s	modest	sample	(n=724)	should	be	noted,	its	approach	was	sophisticated	for	its	
time	and	the	findings	troubled	the	Labour	Party	enough	to	attract	the	attention	of	the	its	National	
Executive	 Committee	 (NEC)	 for	 whom	 the	 Party’s	 Research	 Department	 prepared	 a	 detailed	
briefing	 (LAB/RD.87/1960).	 From	 a	 social	 policy	 perspective,	 the	 survey	 found	 that	 both	
Conservative	 and	 Labour	 voters	 felt	 Labour	was	most	 likely	 to	 be	 the	 party	 that	 ‘would	 extend	
welfare	 services’,	 but	 even	 amongst	 Labour	 voters	 only	 a	 minority	 selected	 extending	 welfare	
services	as	one	of	the	key	characteristics	of	a	good	political	party	(Abrams	and	Rose,	1960:	13-16).	
Findings	such	as	this	–	and	similar	ones	pointing	to	general	ambivalence	towards	nationalisation	–	
led	Abrams	 and	Rose	 to	 question	whether	 Labour	 could	 appeal	 to	 a	 society	 in	which	 traditional	
industrial	 occupations	 were	 in	 decline.	 The	 appeal	 of	 state	 ownership	 was	 also	 debated	 by	 the	
party’s	Housing	Group	following	the	election	defeat,	 the	Party’s	Research	Department	noting	that	
‘the	 ideal	 of	 owning	 one’s	 own	 house	 is	 one	 that	 a	 large	 majority	 of	 the	 population	 share’,	 an	
unattributed	 1957	 survey	 finding	 ‘65%	 of	 all	 interviewed	 said	 they	 had	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	
owning	their	own	house,	6%	more	had	the	same	preference	though	less	strongly’	(LAB/RD8/1959:	
7).		
	
Attitudes	to	Welfare	in	The	1960s		
Labour,	 of	 course,	 did	 go	 on	 to	 win	 the	 1964	 &	 1966	 General	 Elections	 (albeit	 with	 a	 platform	
rooted	 in	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 modernisation	 and	 meritocracy).	 A	 decade	 after	 the	 PEP	 survey,	New	
Society	magazine	undertook	a	detailed	survey	of	attitudes	to	the	welfare	state	in	1967,	a	sample	of	c.	
1,300	households	responding	to	questions	on	a	wide	range	of	topics	that	included	housing,	health,	
education	and	social	security	(see	Nevitt,	1967;	Wedderburn,	1967;	Forsyth,	1967;	Donnison,	1967;	
Wiseman,	1967).	Figure	3	shows	attitudes	towards	future	spending	balanced	a	little	more	towards	
favouring	 increased	 spending	 (56%)	 than	 against	 (33%);	 just	 one	 third	 felt	 that	 too	 much	 was	
spent	 on	 some	 social	 services.	 Questions	 probing	 personal	 experience	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	
	7	
suggested	a	fairly	equally	split	between	those	viewing	it	as	a	great	help	and	those	seeing	it	helping	a	
little/none	 at	 all.	 Notably,	 health	 was	 again	 by	 far	 and	 away	 the	 part	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	most	
commonly	cited	as	being	of	most	help	to	respondents.		
[figure	3	here]	
The	 complexity	 of	 attitudes	 was	 highlighted	 by	 responses	 to	 questions	 on	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
Supplementary	Benefit/National	Assistance	safety	net.	A	 large	majority	(73%)	agreed	there	were	
‘many	 people	 drawing	 supplementary	 benefit/national	 assistance	 who	 could	 really	 be	 earning	
enough	to	support	themselves	if	they	wanted	to’,	but	a	similarly	large	majority	(71%)	agreed	‘there	
are	many	 people	who	 need	 to	 draw	 supplementary	 benefit/national	 assistance	 but	who	 are	 not	
doing	 so’.	 Wedderburn	 (1967:	 516)	 argued	 this	 showed	 ‘the	 concept	 of	 the	 “deserving’’	 and	
‘’undeserving”	 poor	 is	 still	 very	much	 alive’.	 	 Deserving/undeserving	 stereotypes	 (van	 Oorschot,	
2000;	 2006;	 Hudson	 and	 Lunt	 et	 al,	 forthcoming)	 could	 certainly	 be	 found	 in	 other	 survey	
responses;	of	those	who	felt	too	much	was	being	spent	on	a	social	service,	 ‘National	Assistance	is	
too	easy’	was	the	most	common	reason	given	(17%),	while	around	10%	cited	that	family	allowance	
‘wasn’t	 spent	 on	 children’	 and	 a	 similar	 proportion	 saying	 ‘parents	 should	 subsidise	 their	 own	
children’	 (Wiseman,	 1967).	 By	 contrast,	 ‘OAPs	 need	more	money’	was	 the	most	 common	 reason	
given	(27%)	by	those	who	felt	more	money	needed	to	be	spent	(ibid.).		
Some	 scepticism	 towards	 state	 intervention	 in	housing	was	evident,	 88%	saying	 council	 housing	
should	be	targeted	towards	‘those	most	in	need’	and	61%	that	council	tenants	should	be	able	to	buy	
their	council	houses	compared	with	33%	saying	it	should	be	kept	as	a	pool	of	public	housing	(Nevitt,	
1967).	 Public	 concerns	 over	 the	 efficacy	 of	 spending	 could	 even	 be	 seen	 in	 relation	 to	 health	
spending	 too;	 while	 the	 NHS	 was	 the	 second	 most	 common	 area	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 to	 be	
highlighted	as	meriting	further	spending,	it	was	also	the	service	(as	opposed	to	cash	benefit)	most	
often	 flagged	as	an	area	 for	cuts	amongst	 those	 feeling	too	much	was	being	spent	on	some	social	
services,	‘abuse	of	free	prescriptions’	a	concern	for	some	(Forsyth,	1967).		
Snippets	of	data	such	as	these	hint	at	some	public	concern	over	the	scale	of	the	welfare	state	during	
the	1960s	which	a	series	of	studies	conducted	by	the	Institute	of	Economic	Affairs	(IEA)	aimed	to	
explore	(see	Seldon	and	Gray,	1967).	Although	some	concerns	about	the	IEA’s	approach	means	we	
should	interpret	their	findings	cautiously6,	some	important	points	emerge.	Firstly,	they	suggested	
that	opinion	was	not	quite	so	firmly	behind	the	welfare	consensus	as	commonly	presumed,	though	
we	 must	 underline	 that	 even	 the	 IEA’s	 work	 was	 rooted	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 challenge	 what	 they	
described	as	the	‘assumption	that	reform	away	from	universal	benefits	was	politically	impossible’	
(Seldon,	 1967:	 11).	 Secondly,	 important	 variations	 in	 strength	 of	 support	 between	
groups/geographic	areas	were	identified.	For	example,	IEA’s	1966	survey	found	the	working	class,	
council	tenants	and	people	living	in	Scotland	or	the	north	of	England	were	more	likely	to	support	
universalism	(Seldon,	1967:	17-21).		
In	 1968,	 at	 the	 behest	 of	 Richard	 Crossman,	 the	 government	 commissioned	 a	 survey	 of	 public	
attitudes	to	welfare	to	feed	into	the	work	of	the	newly	established	Department	of	Health	and	Social	
Security.	 However,	 with	 echoes	 of	 the	 1940s,	 Treasury	 concerns	meant	 questioning	was	mainly	
restricted	to	a	test	of	public	understanding	of	current	benefits	and	the	report	was	never	published7	
(see:	PRO/BN/72/31,	PRO/T227/2592	and	PRO/T227/3094).	The	survey’s	findings	provide	some	
useful,	albeit	limited,	insights	(PRO/T227/3094).	Questions	on	the	awareness	of	health	and	social	
security	financing	showed	much	confusion	amongst	the	public	about	the	operation	of	the	welfare	
state,	be	 it	 in	 terms	of	principles	of	 finance	or	benefit	and	contribution	rates.	When	asked	 if	 they	
would	like	to	pay	higher	contributions	to	get	a	higher	pension,	around	half	said	they	would	prefer	
to	stick	with	current	contributions	for	current	benefits	and	just	one-third	would	want	to	contribute	
more	in	order	to	receive	more.	Around	65%	of	respondents	said	they	would	be	willing	to	pay	more	
to	help	specific	‘vulnerable	groups’,	though	variations	in	terms	of	which	groups	they	would	like	to	
support	reflected	common	deserving/undeserving	stereotypes:	‘old	people	living	alone’	and	groups	
of	disabled	people	were	high	on	the	list	of	those	people	were	willing	to	pay	more	to	support	further,	
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while	only	a	very	small	minority	supported	extra	spending	for	‘men	who	are	homeless	because	they	
are	 alcoholics’,	 ‘deserted	 wives’,	 or	 ‘men	 who	 are	 homeless	 because	 they	 are	 ex-prisoners’,	 for	
example.		
Taken	together,	1960s	data	suggest	some	aspects	of	social	policy	were	looked	upon	disapprovingly	
by	many,	and	there	was	at	least	a	substantial	minority	(if	not	more)	who	felt	that	targeting	may	be	
beneficial	in	some	areas.	In	his	review	of	polling	data	from	the	1940s	to	1960s,	Klein	(1974:	411)	
argued	 public	 opinion	 ‘tends	 to	 be	moralistic	 […	 and	 this]	 emerges	 clearly	when	 opinions	 about	
pensions	and	family	allowances	are	compared.	With	remarkable	consistency	over	the	years,	there	is	
a	 very	 large	majority	 which	 favours	 raising	 pensions	 and	 a	 very	 large	minority	 which	 is	 highly	
critical	of	family	allowances’.	Interestingly,	he	also	reported	findings	from	a	private	poll	carried	out	
by	ORC	for	the	Conservative	Party	 in	1968	that	showed	89%	agreed	that	 ‘Too	many	people	don’t	
bother	to	work	because	they	can	live	well	enough	on	the	dole’,	and	78%	agreed	that	 ‘We	have	so	
many	Social	Services	that	people	work	less	hard	than	they	used	to’.	Klein’s	(1974:	412)	view	was	
this	showed	there	was	‘overwhelming	support	for	a	moralistic	view	of	the	Welfare	State’.		
	
Attitudes	to	Welfare	in	the	1970s	
Arguably	 the	 most	 detailed	 investigation	 of	 public	 attitudes	 to	 welfare	 in	 the	 1970s	 was	 that	
undertaken	by	the	Leicester	University	Centre	for	Mass	Communication	(LUCMC).	Its	‘Information	
and	the	Welfare	State’	project	was	based	on	fieldwork	in	Leicester	and	Sunderland	in	1977,	with	a	
stratified	 proportionate	 sample	 of	 650	 people.	 It	 provides	 a	 valuable	 exploration	 of	 attitudes	
following	 a	 rise	 in	 economic	 pressures	 and	widespread	negative	media	 coverage	 of	 a	 prominent	
welfare	fraud	trial	portrayed	as	an	example	of	 ‘wasteful’	government	spending,	but	prior	to	what	
are	 typically	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	 peak	 years	 of	 the	 1970s	 crisis	marked	 by	 the	 1978/9	 ‘Winter	 of	
Discontent’.	Figure	4	provides	a	snapshot	of	key	findings.		
[Figure	4]	
Although	we	need	to	exercise	caution	given	its	modest	sample,	the	survey’s	big-picture	question	on	
whether	 too	much	 is	 spent	on	 social	 security	might	be	 taken	 to	 suggest	 a	hardening	of	 attitudes	
when	 compared	 to	 the	New	Society	 study	undertaken	 a	 decade	 earlier.	Whereas	 the	 latter	 found	
just	33%	felt	too	much	was	spent	on	some	social	services,	when	directly	asked	about	social	security	
in	 the	 LUCMC	 study,	 47%	 felt	 too	much	was	 spent	 on	 welfare	 and	 social	 security	 (Golding	 and	
Middleton	1982:	182	f/n5;	PRO/BN/82/133).	The	two	studies	offered	different	response	options,	
so	the	results	cannot	be	directly	compared,	but	other	sources	provide	some	additional	evidence	to	
suggest	there	may	have	been	a	hardening	of	attitudes	towards	social	spending	over	the	course	of	
the	 late-1960s/early	 1970s.	 Butler	 and	 Stokes	 (1974)	 report	 the	 findings	 from	 representative	
surveys	of	 the	electorate	conducted	during	this	period	 for	 their	Political	Change	in	Britain	project	
and,	as	figure	5	shows,	there	appears	to	be	a	shift	towards	favouring	tax	reductions	over	increases	
in	 social	 spending	between	1963	and	19708.	 These	aspects	of	 the	LUCMC	and	Political	Change	in	
Britain	surveys	do	seem	to	suggest	a	decline	in	willingness	to	pay	for	expanding	social	services	over	
this	period.	The	LUCMC	survey	also	seemed	to	reflect	 the	New	Society	study	 in	detecting	a	strong	
degree	of	scepticism	amongst	the	public	over	the	efficacy	of	parts	of	the	welfare	state.		While	a	large	
majority	of	respondents	agreed	that	‘the	welfare	state	in	this	country	is	still	something	we	can	be	
really	 proud	 of’,	 around	 70%	 agreed	 there	 is	 ‘so	much	welfare	 now	 it’s	made	 the	 people	 of	 this	
country	lazy’	and	around	80%	believed	that	‘nowadays	too	many	people	depend	on	welfare’.		
[Figure	5]	
The	British	Election	 Study,	which	 followed	on	 from	Butler	 and	 Stokes’	Political	Change	in	Britain	
project	 from	1974	onwards,	suggests	support	for	cutting	the	welfare	state	 increased	between	the	
19749	and	1979	General	Elections;	while	a	clear	majority	felt	social	services	and	benefits	should	be	
expanded	or	stay	as	 they	were	rather	 than	being	cut	 in	1974	(64%	v	32%),	by	1979	this	was	no	
longer	the	case,	with	the	two	camps	fairly	evenly	sized	but	with	more	favouring	cuts	(46%	v	50%).	
There	was	a	similar	shift	over	this	period	on	the	question	of	whether	welfare	benefits	have	 ‘gone	
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too	far’,	moving	from	a	position	in	1974	where	only	one-third	felt	the	system	had	gone	‘too	far’	to	
one	in	1979	where	almost	half	(49%)	felt	that	way.	However,	we	can	point	to	some	contradictory	
elements	in	the	survey	responses	that	complicate	matters.	In	the	1979	survey,	when	respondents	
were	probed	in	another	question	on	the	strength	of	 their	views	regarding	tax	cuts	versus	service	
cuts,	almost	two-thirds	(62%)	favoured	keeping	up	services;	we	might	also	note	responses	to	this	
question	showed	 feelings	 seemed	 to	 run	stronger	amongst	 those	 favouring	 ‘keeping	up	services’,	
their	responses	more	likely	to	be	‘fairly’	or	‘very’	strong.		
	
Placing	the	BSA	Trends	in	a	Longer	Context	
In	an	attempt	to	crudely	summarise	the	longer	run	picture,	figure	6	plots	data	from	across	different	
surveys	 we	 have	 reviewed	 with	 question	 as	 close	 to	 possible	 to	 the	 BSA	 question	 ‘should	 the	
government	 spend	more	money	 on	 welfare	 benefits	 for	 the	 poor,	 even	 if	 it	 leads	 to	 higher	 taxes?’;	
though	variations	 in	question	wording,	 survey	design	 and	underlying	 context	mean	 the	different	
data	sources	are	not	comparable,	plotting	the	data	in	this	way	helps	visualise	what	may	have	been	a	
‘bounce’	 in	 support	 for	welfare	 spending	 in	 the	1980s.	Though	an	 admittedly	 crude	 exercise,	we	
offer	 it	 as	a	 (visual)	heuristic	device	and	believe	 it	usefully	demonstrates	a	prima	facie	 case	 that,	
over	 the	 longue	durée,	 public	 support	 for	expanding	welfare	has	 fluctuated	over	 time	rather	 than	
merely		declined.	Importantly,	part	of	the	case	for	the	view	that	there	was	a	‘bounce’	in	pro-welfare	
attitudes	in	the	1980s	comes	from	the	British	Election	Study	data	which	allows	to	track	views	from	
as	 far	 back	 as	 197410.	 	As	 table	 2	 shows	while	 a	 higher	 proportion	 of	 respondents	 said	welfare	
benefits	 had	 ‘gone	 too	 far’	 in	 1992	 and	 1987	 than	 did	 in	 1983,	 the	 share	 that	 did	 so	was	much	
greater	 in	1974	and,	especially	so,	 in	1979,	suggesting	the	BSA	may	well	show	a	different	picture	
had	it	begun	a	decade	earlier.		Though	not	relating	directly	to	welfare	state	provision,	Gallup	polling	
on	the	causes	of	poverty	using	a	consistent	question	from	the	1960s	to	the	1980s	also	supports	the	
view	that	public	attitudes	were	more	sympathetic	in	the	1980s	(table	2),	a	much	higher	proportion	
viewing	poverty	as	being	caused	by	circumstances	than	lack	of	effort	in	the	1980s	than	in	the	1960s	
or	1970s.	Opinion	polling	by	Gallup	on	NHS	spending	(table	2)	also	suggests	an	spending	bounce	
for	health	when	the	1960s	are	compared	with	the	1980s	(New	Society,	1980).	
[Figure	6]	
In	 short,	 having	 offered	 a	 brief	 tour	 of	 headline	 findings	 in	 surveys	 from	 1942-1979,	 a	 broader	
historical	 perspective	 challenges	 the	orthodox	view	 that	 ‘over	 a	 long	period	of	 time,	 voters	have	
been	withdrawing	support	for	Britain's	welfare	state	on	the	basis	that	they	believe	it	 is	no	longer	
fair’	as	the	Work	and	Pensions	Select	Committee	(2015)	suggest?	The	picture	is	not	straightforward	
–	as	Baumberg	(2014b)	notes	attitudes	are	complex	and	uneven	–	but	the	historical	data	do	provide	
at	 least	 some	 support	 for	 the	 suggestion	 that	 the	 BSA’s	 baseline	 of	 1983	 (or	 shortly	 thereafter)	
offers	a	misleading	view	on	 trends	 in	attitudes	 to	welfare.	A	number	of	 studies	 conducted	 in	 the	
1960s	 and	 1970s	 suggest	 that	 the	 balance	 of	 opinion	 shifted	 from	 favouring	 expansion	 of	 the	
welfare	 state	 towards	 a	 view	 that	 the	welfare	 state	 had	 grown	 enough,	 with	more	 respondents	
starting	to	favour	tax	cuts	and	pointing	to	problems	seen	to	be	associated	with	the	welfare	state	in	
the	 1960s	 and	 1970s.	 It	 may	 be	 that,	 rather	 than	 the	 hardening	 of	 views	 from	 the	 mid-1990s	
reflecting	 a	 long-term	 decline	 in	 support	 for	 the	welfare	 state,	 the	 BSA	 data	 reflect	 there	was	 a	
‘softening’	of	views	during	the	1980s.	This	raises	many	intriguing	questions,	including	whether	the	
shifts	 in	 attitudes	 detected	 in	 the	 BSA	 data	 since	 the	 1980s	 reflect	 a	 long	 term	 movement	 in	
underlying	 societal	values	 or	 the	 fluctuating	 thermostat	effect	 expected	when	underlying	 contexts	
are	in	flux.		
[Table	2]	
We	cannot	here	offer	 a	detailed	 review	of	 the	many	 issues	 raised	by	 the	historical	data	we	have	
compiled	 for	 this	 paper11,	 but	 in	 addition	 to	 challenging	 the	 picture	 of	 a	 long-term	 decline	 in	
support	 for	welfare	presented	by	the	BSA	data,	 the	historical	data	also	accords	with	much	that	 is	
found	in	contemporary	BSA	data.	It	 is	clear	that	there	has	been	a	strong	hierarchy	of	preferences	
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around	social	spending	that	has	persisted	throughout	much	of	the	period	being	examined;	health	is	
typically	the	most	popular	area	by	some	distance,	with	education	and	pensions	also	typically	high	
in	 the	 list	 of	 social	 spending	 priorities.	 Support	 for	 working-age	 cash	 benefits,	 particularly	 the	
unemployed,	tends	to	be	lower	than	support	for	services.	One	important	exception	may	be	around	
family/child	benefits,	where	support	may	have	 increased	considerably	 in	recent	years,	 this	being	
cited	by	many	more	as	a	top	priority	for	social	security	spending	after	decades	of	being	ranked	as	
one	of	the	lowest	priorities12.	There	does	also	appear	to	be	a	moralistic	tone	reflected	in	much	of	
the	data.	 Surveys	 conducted	 in	 the	1950s,	1960s	and	1970s	often	betrayed	very	 clear	notions	of	
there	 being	 distinct	 groups	 of	 ‘deserving’	 and	 ‘undeserving’	 poor	 (Hudson	 and	 Lunt	 et	 al,	
forthcoming).	 ‘Hard’	 attitudes	 are	 very	much	 in	 evidence	 in	 surveys	 conducted	 in	 the	 late	1960s	
and	1970s,	large	majorities	in	some	surveys	agreeing	that	welfare	interventions	made	people	work	
less	hard	and/or	 that	much	welfare	spending	was	going	 to	 the	wrong	places.	However,	 the	same	
surveys	 often	 showed	 a	 good	 degree	 of	 support	 for	 expanding	 welfare,	 underlining	 that	 critical	
attitudes	 towards	 some	 aspects	 of	welfare	 (and	 the	 groups	 in	 receipt	 of	 it)	 do	not	 automatically	
align	with	a	desire	for	deep	cuts	in	spending.	
Indeed,	 a	 still	 bigger	 picture	 underscored	 by	 a	 longer	 run	 view	 of	 attitudes	 data,	 is	 that	 (a)	 the	
welfare	state	is	rarely	a	matter	at	the	top	of	the	agenda	for	the	public,	(b)	that	over	time	attitudes	
have	 been	 fairly	 balanced	 in	 terms	 of	 support	 for/against	 more	 spending/tax/services,	 and	 (c)	
most	of	the	public	have	a	rather	hazy	knowledge	of	the	details	of	policy.	It	does	not	seem	to	be	the	
case,	 from	 the	 data	 we	 have	 uncovered,	 that	 public	 opinion	 was	 strongly	 and	 enthusiastically	
behind	the	 ‘welfare	state’	during	its	 ‘golden	age’	but,	equally,	the	converse	is	also	true;	the	public	
have	not	been	strongly	and	enthusiastically	behind	attempts	 to	cut	 the	welfare	state	either.	After	
undertaking	 his	 own	 very	 detailed	 survey	 of	 public	 attitudes	 to	 welfare	 shortly	 before	 the	 BSA	
began,	Taylor-Gooby	(1982:	344)	noted	that	people’s	attitudes	towards	welfare	displayed	‘a	lack	of	
internal	consistency’	or	‘duality’	(Taylor-Gooby,	1982:	344),	his	data	highlighting	a	rather	balanced	
set	of	views	but	also	a	good	degree	of	ambivalence	to	welfare	issues	in	which	‘The	dominant	note	is	
a	grudging	acceptance	of	state	welfare	cut	across	by	an	 ideology	of	 individualism’	(Taylor-Gooby,	
1983:	52)	pointing	to	‘pragmatic	acceptance’	rather	than	‘positive	commitment’	to	welfare	(Beedle	
and	Taylor-Gooby,	1983:	15).		
The	phrase	‘pragmatic	acceptance’	perhaps	captures	the	picture	since	the	Beveridge	reforms	well.	
While	support	may	have	hardened	in	some	ways	over	time	this	should	not	be	misread	for	a	loss	of	
support;	there	is	still	considerable	support	for	the	welfare	state	and	there	may	be	more	continuity	
here	over	the	past	70	years	than	is	commonly	thought.	Indeed,	dominant	perceptions	of	trends	in	
public	 support	 for	 the	 welfare	 state	 may	 be	 shaped	 by	 two	 overly	 bold	 characterisations:	 one	
concerning	a	perceived	drop	 in	support	 since	 the	1980s,	 the	other	concerning	 the	overwhelming	
support	for	the	welfare	state	in	the	early	post-war	period.			
Although	 it	 is	 a	 commonly	 held	 view	 that	 public	 support	 for	 the	 welfare	 state	 has	 declined	
considerably	since	the	‘golden	age	of	the	welfare	state’	of	the	1950s	and	1960s,	empirical	evidence	
to	 support	 this	 claim	 is	 far	 from	decisive.	 	 From	 today’s	 perspective	where	political	 opinion	 and	
media	 portrayals	 of	 welfare	 often	 seem	 overtly	 hostile	 it	 is	 tempting	 to	 conclude	 that	 those	
sympathetic	 to	 the	welfare	 state	 are	 sailing	 in	 historically	 hostile	 waters	 (Jensen,	 2014)	 or	 that	
those	making	the	political	case	for	the	welfare	state	found	it	easier	to	deliver	change	in	the	‘golden	
age’	because	they	were	buoyed	by	strongly	supportive	public	opinion.	But	our	review	of	historical	
data	 suggests	 that	 there	 was	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 hostile	 public	 opinion	 during	 the	 post-war	 welfare	
consensus	 period.	 A	 longue	 durée	 perspective	 offers	 a	 useful	 corrective	 in	 challenging	 overly	
simplistic	presumptions	about	the	politics	of	social	policy	in	the	past	that	in	turn	risk	fuelling	overly	
pessimistic	views	about	the	possibilities	for	social	policy	in	the	present	and	future.		
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Notes	
																																																								
1	Though	not	our	focus	here,	for	the	avoidance	of	doubt	it	should	be	acknowledged	at	the	outset	that	the	BSA	data	do	
not	all	point	to	a	downward	trend	in	public	support	for	welfare	nor	do	they	suggest	contemporary	public	attitudes	are	
overwhelmingly	hostile	 (see	Baumberg,	2014a,	2014b;	Clery	et	 al,	2013;	Taylor-Gooby	and	Taylor,	2015).	 Indeed,	 in	
2011	51%	of	BSA	respondents	agreed	that	‘the	creation	of	the	welfare	state	is	one	of	Britain’s	proudest	achievements’	
compared	with	just	15%	disagreeing	with	this	statement	(Clery	et	al.,	2013).			
2	19	different	responses	were	classified,	46%	of	the	sample	did	not	respond	and	10%	offered	an	unclassified	response)	
3	This,	of	course,	may	well	have	affected	the	opinion	data	we	have	inherited	from	them.	We	might	add	here	Macnicol’s	
(1998:	 387-8)	useful	warning	 that	 ‘when	attempting	 to	 evaluate	public	 responses	 to	 the	Beveridge	proposals	 […]	 	 a	
number	of	problems	present	themselves	[…	including	that]	During	the	entire	war	there	operated	in	Britain	a	massive	
and	 sophisticated	 government	 propaganda	 campaign	 […	 and	 that]	 	 Censorship,	 patriotism,	 the	 social	 confusion	 of	
wartime,	the	disruptive	effect	of	military	call-up,	plus	numerous	practical	factors	(such	as	the	paper	shortages)	created	
a	society	in	which	dissident	views	found	little	outlet	[…	and]	political	criticism	was	muted,	not	only	inside	parliament	
but	also	in	public	life	generally.’.	
4	This	is	the	wording	recorded	in	the	Gallup	archive,	if	not	of	the	actual	acts.	
5	This	 likely	 reflected	 moralistic	 attitudes	 about	 families	 with	 larger	 numbers	 of	 children	 being	 undeserving	 of	
government	support:	see	Welshman	(2013)	on	1940s	debates	about	‘problem	families’..	
6	For	example,	though	focused	on	‘universalism’,	the	IEA’s	own	summary	of	the	research	noted	that	‘‘universalism’	has	
been	interpreted	fairly	loosely’	(Gray,	1967:		footnote,	page	65)	
7	A	recent	biography	of	Abel-Smith	(Sheard,	2014:	226)	makes	passing	reference	to	the	survey	and	the	secrecy	around	
it,	noting	‘the	handful	of	officials	who	knew	about	it	were	asked	not	to	make	its	existence	known’.	Crossman	tried	slip	
headlines	 from	 the	 survey	 into	 the	 public	 domain,	 but	 when	 the	 Treasury	 got	 wind	 of	 this	 they	 blocked	 it	 in	 no	
uncertain	 terms	on	 the	basis	 the	Chancellor	was	 ‘very	much	 concerned	with	 the	balance	between	 contributions	 and	
taxation’	and	so	has	‘now	asked	that	no	press	notice	should	be	issued	until	he	has	had	an	opportunity	to	consider	the	
full	results	of	the	survey	[…]	and	to	discuss	with	the	Secretary	of	State	[Crossman]	what	conclusions	should	be	drawn	
from	them	and	what	public	statements	should	be	made	about	them’	(PRO/T227/3094)	
8	There	 are	 contradictory	 elements	 in	 the	 responses	 to	 the	 Political	Change	 in	Britain	 surveys;	 though	 in	 the	 1966	
survey	some	55%	of	respondents	said	they	favoured	tax	cuts	over	more	spending	on	the	social	services,	when	asked	
‘Do	you	think	the	government	should	spend	more	on	pensions	and	social	services	or	do	you	feel	that	spending	for	social	
services	should	stay	about	as	it	is	now?’,	55%	opted	for	more	spending	(Butler	and	Stokes,	1974:	Appendix	B).		
9	Practical	 constraints	meant	 only	 one	 post-election	 survey	was	 conducted	 in	 1974	despite	 there	 being	 two	General	
Elections	that	year	
10	Although,	 countering	 this	 advantage,	 is	 that	 the	 wording	 of	 the	most	 pertinent	 question	 posed	 to	 respondents	 is	
clumsy	and,	unfortunately,	the	response	options	were	simplified	for	the	1983	survey.	
11	A	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 data	 sources	 used	 here	 and	 an	 overview	 of	 key	 findings	 can	 be	 found	 online	 at	
https://goo.gl/Tk2Fek		
12	This	 may	 reflect	 changes	 to	 the	 structure	 and	 recipient	 base	 of	 child/family	 benefits	 over	 the	 many	 decades	
considered	here.	The	broad	brush	analysis	we	are	able	to	offer	here	loses	the	nuance	about	programme	rules	affecting	
attitudes	that	more	detailed	exploration	of	examples	such	as	these	would	allow.	
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Tables	&	Figures	
	
	
	
	
Table	1:	Gallup	1953	Poll	on	Spending	Preferences	
	 Favour	Increased	Spending	 Favour	Reduced	
Spending	
	 …even	if	it	means	tax	
rises	
Pensions	 81%	 59%	 6%	
Housing	 59%	 35%	 15%	
Education	 42%	 26%	 24%	
Health	 30%	 17%	 26%	
Family	Allowances	 23%	 13%	 43%	
	
Source:	Gallup	(1976)	
	
	
	
	
	
	
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
1
1
9
9
3
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
3
Source:2British2Social2Attitudes2Survey
Figure'1:'The'government'should'spend'more'money'on'welfare'benefits'
for'the'poor,'even'if'it'leads'to'higher'taxes
Neither2 Agree/Disagree Agree Disagree
	16	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 	
National(assistance
Family Allowance
Health
Education
National(Insurance
Housing
Figure(2:(Selected(Responses(to(1957/8(PEP(Survey
7%
20%
9%
4%
2%
4%
0%10%20%30%40%50%
Too(Much(is(Spent
14%
23%
30%
35%
45%
49%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
More(Should(be(Spent
Source:1PEP1(1961)
No
Figure)3:)Selected)Responses)to)1967)New$Society Survey
Source:(Wiseman((1967)
Don't)know
Yes
11%
33%
56%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Should)more)be)spent)on)some)social)
services?
15%
52%
33%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%
Is)too)much)spent)on)some)social)
services?
	17	
	
	 	
16%
26%
66%
69%
70%
80%
0
%
1
0
%
2
0
%
3
0
%
4
0
%
5
0
%
6
0
%
7
0
%
8
0
%
9
0
%
Poor/people/have/only/themselves/to/blame,/so/there's/no/
reason/why/society/should/support/ them
Some/people/are/poor/because/other/people/are/rich
The/welfare/state/in/this/country/ is/still/something/we/can/be/
really/proud/of
Many/people/who/should/get/social/security/in/fact/don't/get/
what/they're/entitled/to
There's/so/much/welfare/now/it's/made/the/people/of/this/
country/ lazy
Nowadays/too/many/people/depend/on/welfare
Views&on&the&Welfare&State&today
21%
32%
47%
0
%
5
%
1
0
%
1
5
%
2
0
%
2
5
%
3
0
%
3
5
%
4
0
%
4
5
%
5
0
%
Too/little
About/ right
Too/much
Views&on&Social&Security&Spending
Figure&4:&Selected&Responses&from&1977 LUCMC&Survey
Sources: PRO/BN/82/133;/Golding/&/Middleton,/1982
	18	
	
	
	
	
	
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1963 1966 1969 1970
Figure'5:'If'the'Government'had'a'choice'
between'reducing'taxes'or'spending'more'on'
social'services,'which'should'it'do?
Reduce1taxes Increase1services
	19	
	
	
	 	
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1
9
4
6
1
9
4
8
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
Abrams12 'willing1 to1pay1more1taxes1for1social1benefits'
PEP1&1New1Society1(should1spend1more1on1'social1services'12 does1not1attach1condition1 ‘even1if1taxes1go1up’,1 PEP1'more1or1same')
Figure'6:'Combining'Surveys'3 Should'(Social'Security)'Spending'Increase?
Leicester1 University1CMC11('too1little' social1security1spending1 2 does not1attach1tax1condition)
British1 Election1 Study (Benefits1 'have1not1gone1far1enough')
British1 Social1Attitudes1 Survey1('The1government1should1 spend1more1money1on1welfare1benefits1for1the1poor,1 even1if1it1 leads1to1higher1taxes')
	20	
	
Table	2:	Additional	Data	Supporting	the	1980s		‘Bounce’	Thesis	
Year	 British	Election	Study:	
Welfare	Benefits	
Gallup:	
Causes	of	Poverty	
Gallup:	
NHS	Spending	
	 Too	far/much	
too	far	
About	right	 Not	quite	far	
enough/not	
nearly	far	enough	
Lack	of	Effort	 Circumstances	 Too	much	 Too	little	
1961	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 23%	 30%	
1964	 -	 -	 -	 28%	 38%	 -	 -	
1965	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 17%	 23%	
1968	 -	 -	 -	 35%	 30%	 -	 -	
1974	 33%	 42%	 22%	 -	 -	 -	 -	
1975	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 10%	 54%	
1977	 -	 -	 -	 33%	 30%	 -	 -	
1979	 49%	 32%	 17%	 -	 -	 -	 -	
1980	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 4%	 70%	
1983	 19%	 49%	 28%	 -	 -	 -	 -	
1985	 -	 -	 -	 21%	 49%	 -	 -	
1987	 24%	 39%	 34%	 -	 -	 -	 -	
1992	 16%	 35%	 43%	 -	 -	 -	 -	
	 	
Source:	British	Election	Study	(Crewe	et	al,	1974-1979;	
Heath	et	al,	1983-1992)		
	
Sources:	Gallup	(1976),	Tyler	(1990),	New	Society	(1980)	
	
	
